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PARTNERSHIPS
Steven A. Waters*

URING the Survey period, few partnership cases were reported,
and only one that the author found to be worth reporting. Likewise, none of the statutory changes made by the last Texas Legislature during this period was significant enough to mention. Perhaps next
year will be more bountiful.
Welder v. Green.' The important partnership case decided during this
Survey period demonstrates some key implications of being a partner in a
partnership at will. A general partnership is "at will" if it has no term and
is not organized for a particular undertaking. 2 The principal consequence
of an at-will partnership is that, after dissolution, each partner, unless the
partners have agreed otherwise, may force a liquidation and distribution
3
of the assets that remain after liabilities are paid.
Welder and Green were partners (without a written partnership agreement) in a public accounting partnership for less than five years, until
Green dissolved it. 4 The dissolution came on the heels of Welder's objections to Green's questionable "characterization" of $55,000 in fees from a
client as trust management fees due to Green personally, and not to the
partnership. 5 The essential facts of this case are: (1) Green was an existing partner in a partnership that Welder joined;6 (2) Green assigned
client relationships to himself or Welder for handling;7 (3) Green received what he characterized as "trust management fees" from a firm cli* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law,
Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas. The author acknowledges the contribution of Anamaria Palla.
1. 985 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, 1998, pet. denied).
2. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 31(1)(b) (Vernon 1970). The Texas Uniform Partnership Act ("TUPA") states that dissolution is caused: (1) without violation of
the agreement between the partners, (b) By the express will of any partner when no definite term or particular undertaking is specified. Id. Although the Texas Revised Partnership Act ("TRPA") became effective January 1, 1994, it did not become applicable to preexisting partnerships, like the one here, until January 1, 1999. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 6132b-11.03, (Vernon Supp. 2000). The result in this case would have been the
same, however, under TRPA section 8.01(a) or (g). See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
61326-8.01(a), (g) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
3. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 61326 § 38(1) (Vernon 1970) ("When dissolution is caused in any way, except in contravention of the partnership agreement, each partner . . . may have the partnership property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the
surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective partners.").
4. See Welder, 985 S.W.2d at 173.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
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ent, which Welder challenged as misappropriation of firm revenues; 8 (4)
prompted by the challenge, Green suggested dissolution, to which he and
Welder and their attorneys agreed; 9 (5) after the dissolution, Welder took
$80,000 worth of business with him, but left behind several clients for
whom he had held responsibility for the firm; 10 and (6) Welder asserted
that Green "cherry picked" the better clients for himself, a result of
Green's having previously assigned them to himself to handle for the
firm.l" All of this, Welder asserted, added up to fraud and breach of the
fiduciary duty owed between partners.' 2 The jury agreed, and awarded
Welder substantial damages for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, and
monetary awards for his share of partnership goodwill and other partnership assets. 13 While the trial court agreed with Welder that there was
some evidence that Green had breached his fiduciary duty by re-characterizing the trust management fees as his personal income, it found no
evidence of damages.1 4 The trial court rendered a judgment1 5 n.o.v. on
that issue and on Welder's fraud and fiduciary breach claims.
Although Welder is not a startling or novel case, it does contain a few
nuggets of instruction on the rules governing dissolution of a partnership
at will and, specifically, professional partnerships. Welder lost because he
failed to submit any evidence to support all but one of his claims.1 6 Primarily, this case reinforces that: (1) absent a partnership agreement provision to the contrary, 17 any partner has the absolute right to dissolve the
partnership at any time; and (2) "goodwill" is typically not a partnership
asset in a professional partnership-for goodwill to be considered an asset to be divided on dissolution requires a showing that it exists independently of the skills of the professionals.1 8 It is the rare professional
service firm that has that sort of institutionalgoodwill. When dissolution
is proper-and in a partnership at will where any partner may dissolve at
any time, it would be hard to effect an improper dissolution-working
hard to attract the old firm's clients is not, of itself, improper or actionable. Former partners who end up on the short end of that process have to
show damages that result from tortious activity and not just from the dis8. See id. at 173.
9. See id. at 176.
10. See id. at 177.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 173.
13. See id. at 174.
14. See id. at 175. Green had neutralized that issue by giving Welder one-half of the
fee less than a month after Green's purported usurpation. See id. at 176.
15. See id. at 174.
16. Welder was not required to demonstrate very much, either. The standards in reviewing a no evidence point are high-if "more than a scintilla of evidence supports the
jury finding," then all other evidence is disregarded. See id. at 174 (citing Garcia v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 751 S.W.2d 857, 858 (Tex. 1998)).
17. The appellate court mistakenly suggested that the contrary agreement must be
contained in a written partnership agreement. Oral partnership agreements are enforceable; their existence is just harder to prove.
18. See id. at 178.
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solution and winding up process.'
2°
parently got the better ones.
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Simply stated, Welder and Green ap-

19. See id. at 177. The court specifically held that "self-gain as a motive in declaring a
dissolution, without more, does not constitute bad faith or a breach of fiduciary duty." Id.
When a partnership is properly dissolved and if there is no agreement on how to divide
former business relationships and employees, there is very much an open competition/maythe-best-person-win situation. Here, Green had some built-in advantages and came out
ahead.
20. One certainly could imagine a few changes to the facts that might change the result
(e.g. dishonest, bad faith conduct leading up to the dissolution, calculated to result in a
partners' ending up with more than "her share" of firm assets), but that was not this case.

1206

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

